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Abstract
MNEs shape the location of activities in the world economy, linking diverse
regions in what has been called the global factory. This study portrays the
evolution of incomes and employment in the global factory using a quantitative
input–output approach. We find emerging economies forging ahead relative to
advanced economies in income derived from fabrication activities, handling the
physical transformation process of goods. In contrast, convergence in income
derived from knowledge-intensive activities carried out in pre- and post-
fabrication stages is much slower. We discuss possible barriers to catching-up
and policy implications for emerging economies in developing innovation
capabilities, stressing the pivotal role of MNEs.
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INTRODUCTION
The past 30 years have witnessed the phenomenal growth of global
production networks and significant changes in the location of
manufacturing-related activities worldwide, away from the
advanced economies and towards the emerging economies. The
resultant international division of labor has been termed the global
factory (GF) (Buckley, 2009a, 2009b, 2011; Buckley & Ghauri, 2004).
The activities in the GF are linked by cross-border flos of interme-
diate products and knowledge as part of complex strategies by
multinational enterprises (MNEs) to reduce location and transac-
tion costs1. This refashioning of the global economy has been
effected through foreign investment and outsourcing by MNEs
from advanced countries to emerging economies, as well as the
arrival and growth of indigenous MNEs in the emerging economies
(Buckley & Strange, 2015). One could easily describe developments
in this period as a process of convergence and catch-up, perhaps
even leapfrogging, of emerging economies, exemplified by the
growth of innovation hubs, such as in regions around Bangalore
and Shanghai (Chaminade & Vang, 2008; Lorenzen & Mudambi,
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2013), and success stories of Chinese, Indian and
Brazilian firms (such as Huawei, Haier, Tata or
Marcopolo) becoming global players operating at
the technological frontier. Moreover, many MNEs
from advanced economies (AMNEs) are reported to
have offshored not just production and assembly
activities but also more challenging and rewarding
activities, such as human resource management,
customer support, and accounting and finance, as
well as R&D and design. AMNEs have also offshored
associated technical, managerial and marketing
knowledge contributing to the development of
capabilities within the emerging economies, not
only at the level of production but also in creating
the knowledge behind products (Pyndt & Pedersen,
2006; Dossani & Kenney, 2007; Mudambi, 2008;
Gospel & Sako, 2008; Lewin, Massini, & Peeters,
2009; Lewin, Kenney, & Murmann, 2016; Gereffi &
Fernandez-Stark, 2016; Belderbos, Sleuwaegen,
Somers, & De Backer, 2016; Mudambi, 2018).
In a recent popular book, Baldwin (2016) draws
out the economic implications of the evolving GF.
He concludes that the unbundling of value-chain
activities has led to the deindustrialization of the
advanced economies, to the industrialization of a
selection of emerging economies, and to a conver-
gence of income levels between the advanced and
the emerging economies. Some initially poor coun-
tries grew fast through quickly enlarging the scale
of manufacturing activities, providing gainful
employment opportunities for an underutilized
workforce. Activities in emerging economies sub-
stituted in large part for activities that were previ-
ously carried out by workers in advanced countries,
negatively affecting local demand for low-skilled
jobs in manufacturing industries. Meanwhile,
demand for knowledge workers who are comple-
mentary to the emergence of the GF, such as
managers, ICT specialists and marketers, increased
in all regions. Baldwin refers to this period in world
history as a period of the ‘‘Great Convergence’’.2
The use of the adjective ‘‘Great’’ is debatable,
however, as cross-country gaps in income are still
large: in 2017, gross domestic product (GDP) per
capita in Brazil, China, India, Indonesia or Mexico
was less than one-third of the level in the United
States.3 Moreover, there are still a sizeable number
of low-income countries that have no, or at best a
shallow, connection to the GF, forgoing the poten-
tial benefits from participating in the new interna-
tional division of labor. Some observers even posit a
‘‘middle-income trap’’, as growth in emerging
economies appears to be slowing down after reach-
ing a certain income threshold that is well below
the incomes at the global frontier (Eichengreen,
Park, & Shin, 2014; Bulman, Eden, & Nguyen,
2017).
What is behind the lack of income convergence
in the global economy? In an influential study,
Rodrik (2012) found that this is not so much due to
lagging productivity growth but due to the lack of
catch-up in the scale of modern manufacturing. He
documents so-called ‘unconditional convergence’,
finding rapid catch-up in labor productivity levels
(output per worker) in manufacturing for poorer
countries, regardless of their geography, institu-
tions, or other country-specific characteristics. Yet,
catch-up in income (aggregate GDP per capita) is
much weaker, as the scale of manufacturing grows
only slowly. Rodrik (2014, 2018a) hypothesizes that
modern technologies, such as robotization, are
substituting for unskilled labor such that industri-
alization benefits a small group of highly produc-
tive firms that generate limited employment
opportunities. Rodrik’s hypothesis suggests that,
once countries start up manufacturing activities,
rapid productivity growth will automatically follow
through the transfer of knowledge and modern
machinery from the global frontier. Yet, there is an
abundant literature, discussed later in this paper,
that argues that technology catch-up is not a
simple linear process. Instead, it is governed by
different forces that vary at different rungs of the
technology ladder. This is suggestive of a more
nuanced study of convergence and catch-up in the
world economy than provided by Baldwin (2016) or
Rodrik (2012). There is a clear need to distinguish
between catch-up in productivity and catch-up in
the scale of activities, as well as deeper study of
different types of activity. In this paper, we provide
such an analysis, asking, and answering, two
straightforward questions. First, how fast was
growth in income and productivity of workers in
emerging economies that participated in the GF,
compared to workers in advanced economies?
Second, does growth vary across different types of
activities in the GF? These questions are worthy of
further investigation, as they explicitly link MNE
behavior and GF dynamics to income generation
and distribution around the world. We will for the
first time quantify the speed and depth of
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convergence in both types of activities in the GF,
and discuss implications for policy.
Our findings suggest a nuanced understanding of
the convergence process in the GF. We define the
GF as the ensemble of all activities related to the
production of manufacturing goods. These activi-
ties can take place in MNEs or national firms, and
can be classified in the manufacturing sector as well
as other sectors of the economy (such as business
services) that contribute to the production process.
One main finding is that productivity growth in the
GF was much higher in our set of emerging
economies (including, among others, China and
India) than in our set of advanced economies
(including, among others, Europe, Japan and the
United States). Yet, productivity started to grow
from an extremely low level such that a major
productivity gap still remains. Next, we focus on
the scale of activities.
A key distinction in our analysis is between
fabrication activities and knowledge-intensive (KI)
activities. Fabrication activities refer to the tradi-
tional manufacturing and assembly stages within
global production networks involving the physical
transformation process of goods. We distinguish
these from knowledge-intensive (KI) activities that
include pre-production activities (such as R&D and
design) as well as post-production (marketing and
distribution) activities. It is well known that remu-
neration for KI activities is much higher than for
fabrication activities, as illustrated in the well-
known ‘‘smile curve’’ first formulated by Stan Shih
of Acer in 1992 (Mudambi, 2008; Park, Nayyar, &
Low, 2013). Our second main finding is that there
is strong catching-up and occasionally forging
ahead in the scale of fabrication activities by emerg-
ing economies over the past 3 decades. Yet,
convergence in the scale of KI activities in the GF
is much slower, in particular in machinery, chem-
icals and pharmaceutical products. Low productiv-
ity levels, combined with the limited scale of KI
activities carried out in the GF, results in an income
per head of the population in emerging economies
of only about a third of the level of advanced
economies as of 2014. Our findings do not gainsay
that there are many case studies of successful MNEs
in emerging economies that have been able to
graduate. Our results suggest rather that these are
the exceptions and not the rule, hinting to the
existence of major barriers to widespread technol-
ogy acquisition and adoption by indigenous firms
in emerging economies. In line with Rodrik (2012),
we argue that it is the combination of convergence
in productivity and scale in the GF that ultimately
determines a country’s success in catching-up in
GDP per capita.
The paper proceeds as follows. We first provide a
theoretical background to convergence dynamics
in the GF, drawing upon theories from Interna-
tional Business as well as from International Eco-
nomics. We stress that fabrication activities require
investment, and the development of capabilities, in
imitative production activities, basically operating
and replicating existing technologies. KI activities
require innovation capabilities which are typically
developed only after, and based on, previously
developed production capabilities. This is not a
simple evolutionary process and many impedi-
ments to the catching-up in innovative activities
have been identified in the literature as will be
discussed. Next, we outline the decomposition
method and discuss data sources to trace the
location and characteristic of activities in the GF.
Our approach is highly data-intensive, but has a
very clear intuition, using information on trade
and employment across industries and countries to
map the GF. Importantly, we not only take account
of workers in the manufacturing sector but also in
other sectors of the economy. This is crucial
because an increasing share of the activities related
to the production of manufacturing goods takes
place outside the manufacturing sector, in a process
known as ‘‘servicification’’ (Pilat, Cimper, Olsen, &
Webb, 2008; Crozet & Millet, 2017). Standard
statistics that are traditionally used to track the
GF typically refer only to the manufacturing sector
and will not be able to identify the set of services
activities that is intertwined with manufacturing
activities. These services activities will, however, be
included in our analysis which traces all inputs that
are needed in every stage of production, irrespec-
tive of whether it takes place inside or outside the
manufacturing sector. Arguably, advanced econo-
mies have a comparative advantage in such services
activities, such that an analysis relying on standard
manufacturing statistics (such as in Rodrik, 2012) is
prone to (grossly) underestimate the incomes
earned by advanced countries in the GF, and
subsequently overestimate the convergence speed
of emerging economies. We proceed by presenting
our key findings on convergence trends between
advanced and emerging economies for detailed
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product groups as well as for the aggregate, care-
fully distinguishing between catch-up in produc-
tivity and catch-up in scale. We believe the results
carry important policy implications regarding the
generation and distribution of income around the
world, and these are further discussed in the closing
sections.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we will summarize two strands of
literature that help in better understanding the
dynamics in the GF that we document in this
paper. The theory of comparative advantage, as
developed in the field of international economics,
highlights the role of country-level differences in
factor endowments and technology in determining
the location of activities in the world economy.
Originally developed for a world with trade in final
goods, it has recently been reformulated to also
account for what is called ‘‘trade in tasks’’, making it
highly relevant for analyses of the GF. Next, we
discuss theories of international technology diffu-
sion and innovation as developed in the Interna-
tional Business literature. These focus on the
dynamic development of technology adoption by
firms, problematizing the simple evolution from
imitation to innovation as suggested by theories of
international trade and discussing the various
impediments to catching-up in innovative activi-
ties in emerging economies.
The Comparative Advantage of Nations in the
Global Factory
The cornerstone of theories on international trade
and the location of production is David Ricardo’s
theory of comparative advantage. Informally put,
the theory predicts that when barriers to interna-
tional trade are lowered, countries produce and
export more of the goods where they have a
comparative advantage. Nations can derive com-
parative advantage from two sources: differences in
resource endowments and differences in technol-
ogy. Comparative advantage theory focuses on
differences in resource endowments, and Ricardo’s
theory was originally formulated in terms of final
goods (wine and cloth) assuming that all stages in
the production of a good took place in a single
country.
Is his insight still valid in a world with increas-
ing international fragmentation of production, in
short ‘‘unbundling’’ as per Baldwin (2016)? Bald-
win and Evenett (2015) argue that unbundling
does not alter the underlying logic of Ricardo’s
theory. Comparative advantage theory, suitably
reformulated to account for trade in tasks along-
side trade in goods, is useful for understanding the
location of activities in the GF. In the GF,
countries become more specialized in carrying
out particular stages of the production process,
based on their comparative advantage. To see this
in a simple example, consider two goods, A and B,
and two countries, one abundant in skilled labor
(say Germany) and the other abundant in
unskilled labor (say Poland). Good A is skilled
labor-intensive and B is unskilled labor-intensive,
such that Germany initially has a comparative
advantage in A and Poland in B. Following
Ricardo’s theory, when trade costs decline, Ger-
many is expected to produce more A and export
this to Poland, while Poland is expected to
produce more B and export this to Germany.
Now assume that the production process can be
unbundled into separate activities (also referred to
as tasks): A into A1 and A2, and B into B1 and B2.
And suppose that A1 and B1 are skill-intensive
relative to both A2 and B2. Following the logic of
comparative advantage, the expectation is that
activities A1 and B1 will be carried out in
Germany, while activities A2 and B2 in Poland.
In fact, the effects of comparative advantage are
magnified when fragmentation is possible. Before
the unbundling, some unskilled German workers
were employed in the unskilled stage of produc-
tion of A since this was bundled with the skilled
stage. After the unbundling, each country is fully
specialized according to its comparative advantage
in tasks, rather than in products. Timmer, Mir-
oudot, and de Vries (2019) provide evidence that
corroborates the validity of the Ricardian insight
in a world with unbundling. They find a strong
international division of labor in the world econ-
omy, with different tasks being carried out by
participants in global production networks, dub-
bing this a process of functional specialization in
trade. For example, they show that Mexico and
Poland have a revealed comparative advantage in
exporting fabrication activities, Italy and South
Korea in marketing activities, the Netherlands and
the US in management activities and Germany
and Sweden in R&D activities.
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One could argue that the new patterns of
specialization in the global economy reinforces
the importance of national factor endowments and
might postpone the graduation of poor countries
into higher value-added activities. As noted early
on by Porter (1990): ‘‘The central task facing
developing countries is to escape from the strait-
jacket of factor-driven national advantage…where
natural resources, cheap labor, locational factors
and other basic factor advantages provide a fragile
and often fleeting ability to export.’’ (Porter, 1990:
675). Understanding the dynamic process of accu-
mulating knowledge resources is key to the con-
vergence process. This has been the subject of
theories of international technology diffusion and
innovation, as developed in the Innovation and
International Business literature.
International Technology Diffusion and
Innovation
Summarizing a large body of literature, Fu, Pietro-
belli, and Soete (2011: 1604) emphasize that ‘‘in-
novation is costly, risky, and path-dependent… In
principle, if innovations were easy to diffuse and
adopt regardless of their nature and type, a tech-
nologically backward country could catch-up
rapidly by absorbing the most advanced technolo-
gies. [But] technology diffusion and adoption is
neither costless nor unconditional.’’ In another
overview, Fagerberg, Srholec, and Verspagen (2010)
reach similar conclusions. Numerous studies have
suggested a clear sequence in which innovation
capabilities are developed only after, and based on,
previously developed production capabilities. This
stages hypothesis has been advanced in the 1980s
by scholars studying the industrialization and
convergence process in East Asia (Westphal, 1982;
Evenson, 1990; Lall, 1992; Amsden & Tschang,
2003). A more recent example is provided by an in-
depth study of catching-up by emerging economy
multinationals (EMNEs) in the wind turbine indus-
try (Awate, Larsen, & Mudambi, 2012). AMNEs
established wind turbines and the grid network by
around 1990. Within 5 years, an EMNE from India
(Suzlon Energy Inc) entered the industry. Suzlon
acquired the output capabilities within a short time
span, and captured a substantial share of the global
market. However, detailed investigation of the
breadth and depth of patenting data in the wind
turbine industry reveals that, while Suzlon caught
up in terms of production capabilities, it has not
(yet) done so in innovation capabilities (Awate
et al., 2012). In broad terms, we may identify three
sets of issues which underpin the slow process of
catch-up in KI activities: time lags due to required
organizational learning (absorption) by indigenous
firms; constraints on external technology acquisi-
tion; and the slow pace of political institutional
change.
First, path dependency is important in that
indigenous emerging economy (EE) firms clearly
need to develop their own production capabilities
before they are able to upgrade and develop the
capabilities for KI activities (Leonard-Barton, 1992;
Lall, 1992, 1993; Figueiredo, 2002; Altenburg, Sch-
mitz, & Stamm, 2008). There is thus a necessary
time lag between EE firms mastering the require-
ments of undertaking production activities and
developing the capabilities required for KI activi-
ties, due to the necessities of organizational learn-
ing (Teece, 1986; Dixon & Meyer, 2014). As
Lundvall (1992: 1) has noted, ‘the most fundamen-
tal resource in the modern economy is knowledge
and, accordingly, the most important process is
learning.’ This resonates with the notion of eco-
nomic development as a process of ‘‘self-discovery’’
(Hausman & Rodrik, 2003). Cohen & Levinthal
(1990) highlight that the absorptive capacity of
local firms is a limiting factor in effective assimila-
tion of technologies. Firms which are over-reliant
on external technology often have limited internal
capabilities (Levinthal & March, 1993), hindering
catch-up in KI activities.
Second, many emerging economies have histor-
ically endeavored to accelerate economic develop-
ment through opening up to inward foreign direct
investment (FDI) by AMNEs in the expectation that
the FDI will not only provide additional employ-
ment and output but will also lead to the transfer of
advanced technological, management and man-
agerial expertise to indigenous firms both directly
and indirectly through various spillover effects
(Crespo & Fountoura, 2007). Broadly speaking,
there are two channels of foreign technology
acquisition for local firms in EEs. One is that the
firms license the technology from overseas. This
strategy has been successfully applied in East Asia.
For example, Kim (1998) showed how South
Korean automaker Hyundai built upon the experi-
ence in production of cars under a Ford license to
acquire innovation strengths, eventually develop-
ing fully indigenous models. Hobday (2001) docu-
ments the success of similar imitation strategies by
Taiwanese electronics firms. Kumaraswamy,
Mudambi, Saranga, and Tripathy (2012) detail
indigenous auto component firms that adapted to
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market liberalization in India, and conclude that
the initial focus on technology licensing/collabo-
rations and joint ventures with AMNEs laid the
foundations for the integration of the domestic
industry into the global production networks of the
AMNEs. More recently, Turkina and van Assche
(2018) propose a general framework to evaluate
how global connections between local clusters may
strengthen local innovation outcomes. Poor levels
of intellectual property (IP) protection were evident
in many emerging economies in the past (Maskus,
2000), which provided a severe disincentive to the
transfer of valuable technology and intellectual
property (Seyoum, 1996; Smarzynska, 2002; Belder-
bos, Leten, & Suzuki, 2013). There is evidence that
IP protection has improved over time in many
emerging economies, and that this improvement
has led to greater inflows of FDI (Khoury & Peng,
2011; Amokuse & Yin, 2010). Yet, it is unlikely that
foreign licensors could be found for the types of
superior knowledge-based assets and tacit capabil-
ities (e.g., sophisticated technology, well-known
brand names, marketing and management exper-
tise) that would underpin rapid catch-up (Pyndt &
Pedersen, 2006; Elia, Munjal, & Scalera, 2016).
An alternative possibility is that local firms access
the requisite technology through the acquisition of
suitable target firms in advanced economies (and
hence become EMNEs). There is an extensive and
ever-growing literature suggesting that latecomer
EMNEs use internationalization as a ‘‘springboard’’
to acquire strategic assets (e.g., brands, managerial
expertise, technology and distribution channels)
overseas, while also reducing their vulnerability to
institutional constraints at home (see, e.g., early
contributions by Child & Rodrigues, 2005; Math-
ews, 2006; Luo & Tung, 2007). Hennart
(2009, 2012) has argued that EMNEs typically have
preferential access to ‘‘complementary local
resources’’ (including land, labor, natural resources,
infrastructure, and distribution assets). This prefer-
ential access enables the EMNEs to enjoy market
power at home, which in turn provides them with
the profits necessary to acquire foreign assets
through FDI and/or obtain those assets from
foreign MNEs in exchange for access to the local
resources. More recently, there have been signs of
R&D internationalization by EMNEs (Li & Kozhi-
kode, 2009; Awate, Larsen, & Mudambi, 2015;
Papanastassiou et al. 2019). Awate et al. (2015)
report that EMNEs aim to access knowledge from
R&D subsidiaries in advanced economies for inno-
vation catch-up, and that their R&D
internationalization is grounded in the firms’ over-
all catch-up strategies to obtain parity with indus-
try leaders. They conclude that the innovative
capabilities of EMNEs develop more slowly and
with greater difficulty than those of AMNEs. This
suggests once again that external technology sour-
cing is not necessarily a fast track to catching-up in
KI activities.
Third, Fu et al. (2011: 1204) argue that ‘‘despite
the potential offered by globalization and a liberal
trade regime, the benefits of international technol-
ogy diffusion can only be delivered with parallel
indigenous innovation efforts and the presence of
modern institutional and governance structures
and conducive innovation systems.’’ This high-
lights the importance of the national innovation
systems for technological development (Lundvall,
1992; Edquist, 1997; Carlsson, 2006; Lundvall,
2007; Samara, Georgiadis, & Bkouros, 2012; Belder-
bos et al., 2013; Fan, Li & Chen, 2017). More
broadly, it is now established wisdom that institu-
tions matter for development (North, 1991), and
that the absence of effective institutions will
impede the ability of emerging economies (and
indeed any economy) to mobilize economic
resources and to regulate market exchanges. This
has given rise to the concept of ‘‘institutional voids’’
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997), which describes the
under-developed or inefficient nature of many
regulatory systems, capital markets, corporate gov-
ernance mechanisms, IP protection regimes, and
infrastructure in many emerging economies. These
institutional voids present special challenges and
obstacles both for indigenous firms looking to
grow, innovate and diversify at home and overseas
and also for foreign MNEs wishing to enter and
succeed in emerging economy markets (Henisz,
2000; Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000;
Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005;
Bowen, & De Clercq, 2008; Dunning & Lundan,
2008; Henisz & Swaminathan, 2008; Peng, Wang, &
Jiang, 2008; Puffer, McCarthy, & Boisot, 2010;
Holmes, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013; Meyer &
Peng, 2016). There is some evidence of convergence
in institutional quality between (selected) emerging
economies and the advanced economies (see the
World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators),
but this process is far from complete. Acemoglu and
Robinson (2012) find that political institutions are
less likely to change and to converge than eco-
nomic institutions. This is because political elites
may well support the reform of economic institu-
tions, but have an incentive to maintain the
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political institutions that give them political power.
More recently, national sovereignty is undermined
by the rise of the GF. In a networked mode of
organization of the world economy, the ability of
any given state to exert control over a given node or
the network as a whole is limited (Kobrin, 2018).
Slow convergence in institutional quality is likely
to be reflected in a slower convergence in the
development of KI activities across countries than
in fabrication activities.
APPROACH
We define the GF as the ensemble of all activities
related to the production of manufacturing goods.
These activities can take place within an MNE as
well as in a single national firm. The firms engaged
can be classified as manufacturing firms, but can
also be classified outside manufacturing, such as
business services or trading firms. The non-manu-
facturing firms contribute indirectly to the produc-
tion of manufacturing goods through the provision
of services/intermediate inputs in the production
chain. This section introduces a set of indicators
that allow one to track the income and productivity
effects of participation in the GF for a particular
country.
For ease of exposition, we need some basic nota-
tion. Let Lbe thenumber ofworkers in theGF and let
P be the population of a country such that L/P is an
indicator of the scale of participation of a country in
the GF. Note that L does not refer to the total labor
force, but only that part engaged in the GF of
manufactured goods. Workers in the GF can be
engaged in knowledge activities (indicated by super-
script K) or fabrication (F) activities such that
L = LK + LF. The share of knowledge workers (LK/L)
is then an indicator of specialization of a country in
knowledge activities as opposed to fabrication activ-
ities. Each worker generates income such that the
total income of a country generated in the GF is
given by Y = YK + YF. The productivity of workers in a
country that participate in the GF is given by Y/L,
and similarly for knowledge workers YK/LK and
fabrication workers YF/LF.
Using these definitions, we can provide a simple,
yet insightful, decomposition of GF income of a
country per head of the population as follows:
Y
P
¼ L
P
 
 L
K
L
 Y
K
LK
þ 1 L
K
L
 
 Y
F
LF
 
: ð1Þ
GF income of a country relates positively to the
scale of participation in the GF (L/P), its productiv-
ity levels in the two activities (YK/LK and YF/LF), and
the weight of knowledge activities (LK/L).
The framework is useful in better understanding
convergence patterns in the global economy and
the role of GF dynamics. ‘Convergence’ is a statis-
tical concept in the literature on economic growth
that refers to a process of narrowing income gaps
across a set of countries (Baumol, 1986). The
framework highlights different types of conver-
gence: convergence in GF income per capita, which
depends on the scale of activities in the GF and
convergence in the productivity of these activities.
To trace convergence, we will express the level of a
country relative to the world frontier. In particular,
we will track the degree of convergence between
AMEs and EEs. We group Australia, Canada, Japan,
South Korea, Taiwan, the United States, and the 15
pre-2004 members of the European Union in one
group (the AMEs) and place all other countries,
including the BRIC and Eastern European coun-
tries, in the world in the other group (EEs). Roughly
speaking, this can be viewed as a comparison of the
high-income countries of the world with other
countries that play an active role in international
trade (Hanson, 2012; Timmer, Erumban, Los,
Stehrer, & de Vries, 2014; Baldwin, 2016).5
We will trace the following relative measures:
Income ratio GF income per head of populationð Þ :
:
YEE
PEE
 
YAME
PAME
 
ð2aÞ
Scale ratio GF workers per head of populationð Þ :
LEE
PEE
 
LAME
PAME
  ð2bÞ
Productivity ratio GF income per GF workerð Þ :
YEE
LEE
 
YAME
LAME
  ð2cÞ
Convergence in GF income per head is highly
relevant from a welfare perspective. It is the con-
tribution of GF participation to GDP per capita in a
country. Keeping all other elements constant, GF
income convergence can be accomplished by a
country through increasing the scale of GF activi-
ties. Alternatively, productivity convergence in one
(or both) of the activities will lead to GF income
Catching-up in the global factory Peter J. Buckley et al
Journal of International Business Policy
convergence. Finally, GF income convergence can
be driven by specialization of the country in the
more productive KI activities. We will quantify
each of the drivers of GF income convergence in
the next section. Each element of the framework
has a clear interpretation and can be fruitfully
linked to specific policy areas. For example, the
participation in the GF will depend among others
on the general trade and investment openness of a
country, while specialization in knowledge activi-
ties will depend in part on the sophistication of a
country’s system of innovation. Productivity
growth in fabrication activities can be stimulated
by targeted industrial policies to advance product
and process innovations, but may also exhibit
patterns of unconditional convergence (Rodrik,
2012). This will be discussed in-depth in the policy
section of this paper.
We measure GF income through empirical iden-
tification of the location and income of workers in
the GF of final manufacturing goods. This approach
can be seen as the macro-economic equivalent of
the ‘forensic’ case-study approach taken by
Dedrick, Kraemer, and Linden (2010). They studied
the distribution of income and jobs in the produc-
tion of the (by now obsolete) Apple iPod, circa
2006. The production process of the iPod is exem-
plary for the unbundling of production processes
with intricate regional production networks feed-
ing into each other. It was assembled in China from
more than 100 components and parts sourced from
around the world. So-called ‘‘teardown’’ reports
provided technical information on the inputs used
in the assembled product (such as the hard-disk
drive, display and memory) as well as their market
prices. This allowed the authors to trace the value
captured by activities from the various participants
in the chain beyond Apple, such as Broadcom
(delivering microchips), Toshiba (hard disk) and
Samsung (memory chips). Over 41,000 jobs world-
wide were associated with the iPod global produc-
tion network. A staggering 98% of the fabrication
jobs were located in China and elsewhere in Asia, as
almost all production had been offshored from the
United States. Meanwhile, 65% of the (much
higher-remunerated) engineering and other profes-
sional jobs remained in the United States. The
result was that almost three-quarters of the labor
income generated in the Apple iPod global produc-
tion network was estimated to accrue to US work-
ers, with the Chinese workers capturing less than
2.5% (Linden, Dedrick, & Kraemer, 2011). Dedrick
et al. (2010) provide similar decompositions for
some other high-end electronic products such as
notebooks; see also Ali-Yrkko¨, Rouvinen, Seppa¨la¨,
and Yla¨-Anttila (2011) for a study of mobile
phones. Kaplan and Kaplinsky (1999) provided a
seminal contribution on South African peaches.
Such product-level studies have been invalu-
able, but do not give a sense of the generaliz-
ability of the phenomenon. This paper provides
a global overview of GF incomes over the past
three decades. We follow the method by Los,
Timmer, and de Vries (2015) and extend it to
account for labor income from fabrication and
KI activities (see Appendix A for a brief mathe-
matical exposition of the method). In short, we
proceed in two steps. First, we trace, for a given
good, the value that is added by any industry (in
any country) in the world using information
from the so-called global input–output tables.
These are the counterparts to the technical
teardown reports used in product-case studies.
Second, we add information on the type of
workers involved in each industry–country and
their incomes, distinguishing between workers
with occupations involved in fabrication and
those involved in KI activities. This allows us to
trace income for fabrication and KI activities
earned anywhere in the world in the production
of particular goods (e.g., textiles, or electronics).
An illustration of our GF decomposition
methodology is provided in Figure 1. It depicts
a combination of a modular structure (a ‘‘spi-
der’’) with sequential processes (‘‘snakes’’). This is
for illustration only as our measure of GF income
can be calculated for any constellation of the
network and is not restricted to this particular
form. Figure 1 refers to a simplified world econ-
omy consisting of three countries and depicts
the production process of a good for which the
last stage of production takes place in country A
(say a Porsche finalized in Leipzig, Germany).6
To produce it, KI and fabrication activities are
carried out by workers in country A. In addition,
intermediate inputs are needed, some of which
are produced within the country itself. Other
intermediates are sourced from country B. To
produce one of these intermediates, country B
uses domestic workers and intermediate inputs
produced in country C. Based on information of
the size of the various production linkages and
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the labor incomes of the workers, the contribu-
tions of KI and fabrication activities in this GF
by countries A, B, and C can be calculated.
DATA
This section outlines new data to implement the
framework introduced above. Basically, we com-
bine information from two datasets to measure the
location and type of incomes in the GF. The first
dataset we use is the World Input–Output Database
(WIOD). The WIOD provides global input–output
tables that can be regarded as a set of national
input–output tables connected to each other by
bilateral international trade flows. They provide
comprehensive summaries of all transactions in the
global economy between industries and final users
of goods and services across countries in a given
year. In particular, the tables contain data on
intermediate products that are used in the produc-
tion of goods and services. These intermediates are
traded within as well as across countries. The
technical details are described in Dietzenbacher
et al. (2013) and Timmer et al. (2015) and not
repeated here.7 A major advantage of using the
WIOD dataset in our analysis is that it is con-
structed under the conventions of the internation-
ally agreed System of National Accounts (SNA) such
that value added and income concepts align closely
with the measurement of official macro-economic
statistics such as GDP, value added and labor
income. We follow the conventions of the SNA
version 2008 as described in European Commission
et al. (2009). This maximizes comparability of
statistics over time as well as across countries. The
WIOD covers 40 economies, together with an
estimate for the ‘‘Rest of the World’’ which includes
all other countries. The countries distinguished are
the 27 EU countries (per January 2007) and 13
other major advanced and emerging economies,
namely Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, India,
Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Korea,
Taiwan, Turkey and the United States. Together,
these countries accounted for over 85% of world
GDP in 2011. A limitation is that many developing
countries in Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa
are not separately distinguished but combined in
the ‘‘Rest of the World’’ group in the global input–
output tables. However, these countries harbor
only a minor share of activities in GFs of goods.8
The WIOD provides data in current US dollars
based on exchange rate conversion of data in
national currencies. It is well known that exchange
rates do not fully reflect the cross-country differ-
ences in consumption prices which contain a large
share of non-tradable services.9 To compare real GF
income across countries, we report the GF income
for each country at purchasing power parity (PPP)
in constant 2011 prices. We use the price levels of
output-side real GDP relative to the USA from the
PennWorld Tables, version 9.0 (Feenstra, Inklaar, &
Timmer, 2015).
Our second database is the Occupations Database
introduced in Reijnders & de Vries (2018) and
Figure 1 Stylized representation of a global factory. This figure depicts a combination of a modular structure (a ‘‘spider’’) with
sequential processes (‘‘snakes’’). Our measure of global factory income can be calculated for any constellation of the network and is
not restricted to this particular form.
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Timmer et al. (2019). It has been updated to 2014
for the purpose of this analysis. It contains infor-
mation on the occupations of workers based on
representative survey and census data collected at
the level of individuals by national statistical offices
such as the Current Population Census and the
annual American Community Surveys for the
United States, European Union Labour Force Sur-
veys, and data from the China Population Censuses
and the China Household Income Project. The
country coverage, industry classification and time
span of these data tally with the WIOD and allow us
to measure the occupational employment and GF
income in global value chains. Appendix B contains
a list of the main sources of data for each country,
as well as a more detailed discussion of the harmo-
nization approach.
The main distinction in our analysis is between
KI and fabrication activities. We define fabrication
activities as those activities carried out by workers
with occupations involved in the physical transfor-
mation process. Example occupations are machine
operators and assemblers. We define KI activities as
activities that are carried out by workers involved in
a wide range of pre-fabrication activities (concep-
tualization, R&D, design, engineering, and specifi-
cation development) as well as post-fabrication
activities (marketing, branding and distribution).
Workers involved in KI activities are employed in
manufacturing and services industries. The alloca-
tion of workers into KI and fabrication activities is
exclusive (each worker features only in one set) and
exhaustive (each worker is allocated to a set).
Appendix C provides details of the two sets of
workers and their descriptions, as well as exemplars
of occupational categories.
CATCHING-UP IN THE GLOBAL FACTORY
In this section, we examine key trends in income
from fabrication and KI activities in the GF.
Following the convergence framework, responses
can be characterized along three dimensions: scale,
productivity and specialization. We will first reduce
dimensionality of the data to facilitate the exposi-
tion and focus on differences in specialization
across countries and changes in GF income.
Table 1 provides detailed information on
changes in real GF incomes for each of the 40
countries in our dataset, ranked according to
growth. China and India stand out, not only for
the size of activities carried out in their economies
but also for their outstanding growth rates, more
than tripling (India) or even quadrupling (China)
real GF income over the period 1995–2014 (see first
three columns of Table 1). Also, Brazil and Turkey
more than doubled their real GF incomes, along-
side a handful of smaller economies (Czech Repub-
lic, Latvia and Slovakia). On the other hand, real GF
incomes declined in some major AMEs including
Italy, the United Kingdom, the United States and,
in particular, Japan during this period. This is not
true for most other AMEs, however, as shown, for
example, by Germany and South Korea, which
managed to increase real GF income by 48% and
78%, respectively. This is because the expansion of
the world economy has been associated with a
larger demand for manufacturing goods as a new
global middle class emerged which allowed for
increased GF incomes in EEs without necessarily
crowding out incomes in AMEs.
Countries varied not only in the growth of real
GF income but also in the type of activities carried
out. This is illustrated by the share of KI activities in
overall GF income shown in the last columns of
Table 1. The results show a stark pattern of special-
ization in the world economy over the period
1995–2014. This pattern is consistent with the
discussion of the division of labor in the literature
review.
A stylized fact emerging from this table is that EEs
are less specialized in KI activities than AMEs. Yet,
in many EEs, there is a rapid decline in the share of
fabrication activities. This is mainly because of the
massive growth of fabrication activities in China,
effectively driving out major competitors of fabri-
cation activities in the world market. Facilitated by
its accession to the World Trade Organization in
2001, China benefited from the rapid international
fragmentation of fabrication and quickly took part
in globally-integrated production networks (Bald-
win, 2016). It should be noted that KI activities in
China grew even faster than fabrication activities,
as the KI share of overall Chinese GF income even
increased (from 37% to 40%). However, in most
other countries, the share of KI activities grew faster
such that in 2014 China still has a major share of
fabrication activities relative to other countries.
India on the other hand had already specialized in
KI-activities by 1995, and remained so in 2014: 70%
of GF income is generated in KI activities as
opposed to 40% in China. Strong changes in
specialization are recorded for Japan and the
United States as the share of KI activities in overall
GF income increased rapidly. At a closer look, it
appears that real income from KI activities
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remained relatively constant over time, while
income from fabrication activities rapidly declined.
This clearly illustrates that trends in the GF have
been relatively benign for knowledge workers in
these countries as demand for their work did not
decline in absolute terms, and increased relative to
demand for fabrication work.10
Figure 3 summarizes the detailed country-level
information, plotting country experiences along
the two dimensions: change in GF income on the
horizontal axis (measured as GF income in 2014
divided by level in 1995) and change in specializa-
tion on the vertical axis (KI income share for 2014
minus the share in 1995). Countries on the east side
of the graph experienced rapid growth in GF
Table 1 GF income and KI specialization in the global factory
Country Real GF income KI income as % of GF income
1995 2014 Change 1995 (%) 2014 (%) Change (%)
China 691,226 2,706,487 3.92 37 40 3
India 212,235 731,543 3.45 65 70 5
Czech Republic 18,077 41,646 2.30 52 64 12
Turkey 60,571 137,659 2.27 48 57 9
Brazil 151,737 332,453 2.19 48 60 12
Latvia 1,578 3,440 2.18 52 69 17
Slovakia 7,082 14,676 2.07 53 63 10
Romania 22,884 44,616 1.95 47 50 3
Russian Federation 178,941 321,908 1.80 64 66 2
South Korea 141,278 251,982 1.78 64 69 5
Indonesia 142,968 249,038 1.74 76 71 - 5
Poland 61,957 106,613 1.72 46 57 11
Luxembourg 1,596 2,531 1.59 68 84 16
Hungary 16,194 24,590 1.52 50 59 9
Estonia 1,851 2,797 1.51 56 61 5
Taiwan 86,555 128,805 1.49 55 62 7
Germany 370,566 548,565 1.48 63 71 8
Ireland 11,691 16,923 1.45 61 70 9
Austria 29,921 42,926 1.43 52 67 15
the Netherlands 57,388 81,751 1.42 71 79 8
Mexico 70,586 96,578 1.37 47 51 4
Denmark 15,943 21,312 1.34 60 71 11
France 162,239 216,638 1.34 62 74 12
Sweden 25,802 34,171 1.32 62 69 7
Canada 91,573 114,848 1.25 54 58 4
Spain 98,663 120,994 1.23 57 69 12
Slovenia 6,269 7,432 1.19 50 62 12
Australia 49,909 56,551 1.13 62 71 9
Greece 17,427 19,656 1.13 57 70 13
Portugal 21,610 24,366 1.13 56 63 7
Belgium 38,128 42,576 1.12 65 75 10
Finland 17,077 19,039 1.11 60 68 8
Bulgaria 14,788 16,216 1.10 54 60 6
Italy 231,650 223,869 0.97 66 67 1
United States 1,040,279 980,516 0.94 51 69 18
United Kingdom 177,170 164,471 0.93 68 74 6
Cyprus 1,177 1,081 0.92 52 75 23
Japan 513,159 452,599 0.88 41 53 12
Malta 936 713 0.76 54 70 16
Lithuania 11,989 6,602 0.55 54 59 5
GF and KI incomes are calculated as described in the main text. The change in GF income is measured as GF income in 2014 divided by the level in
1995. The change in KI specialization is measured as the share in 2014 minus the share in 1995. All income values are expressed in US$ at constant 2011
PPPs.
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income, while countries on the north side experi-
enced rapid KI specialization in the GF. Figure 2
shows China and India are examples of EEs where
the size of activities exploded providing massive
opportunities for gainful employment of previously
underutilized workers, lifting them out of poverty.
On the other extreme, Japan and the United States
are AMEs where the size of GF activities declined, in
particular of fabrication activities. This was one of
the drivers of polarization of the labor markets and
decreasing relative wages for less skilled workers
carrying out routine fabrication jobs. France and
Germany are AMEs which succeeded in benefiting
from the growing global consumer market, increas-
ing the size of activities not only for skilled workers
that carry out KI activities but also for less skilled
workers carrying out fabrication activities. They
were less affected by the China shock than Anglo-
Saxon countries.
For analyzing convergence, we start with income
from all activities in the GF, without distinguishing
between different types of activities. Figure 3 shows
real GF income per capita in EEs as a percentage of
that in AMEs for the period 1995–2014.11 Two
observations stand out. First, a rapid catch-up of
EEs vis-a-vis AMEs since the early 2000s. This
process continued through the 2010s, albeit slow-
ing down at the end of the 2000s. The growth rate
of real GF income over the period 2008–2014 was
- 0.2% for AMEs and 6.9% for EEs.12 Second, by
2014, a sizeable gap remained as the level of GF
income per head in EEs reached 37% of the level in
AMEs. This is because rapid catching-up took place
from a low level, around 15% in the 1990s.13 We
conclude that, in 2014, emerging economies still
only generated less than half the income per capita
of advanced market economies in the GF. This
might be surprising in the light of writings in the
popular press which emphasize the rapid growth of
manufacturing activities in EEs. Yet, this unex-
pected result can be explained once we apply our
framework and distinguish between fabrication and
KI activities, as well as between scale and produc-
tivity convergence.
The overall convergence trend for all activities in
the GF hides an important difference in conver-
gence rates for particular sets of activities. Figure 4
shows the relative ratios of GF income from fabri-
cation and KI activities. EEs have been catching-up
in both activities, but the pace at which EEs were
catching-up was much higher in fabrication activ-
ities. In 2014, GF income per capita in EEs from
fabrication stood at 56.4% of levels in AMEs, but at
only 28.1% for KI activities.
Figure 4 also suggests a difference in the timing
of the convergence process, which seems to have
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started first for fabrication activities. GF income
from KI activities started to converge only around
the mid-2000s. This supports theories related to the
sequential nature of offshoring, first in fabrication
and later in KI activities, as discussed in the
‘‘Theoretical Background’’ section. Interestingly,
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Figure 4 Global factory income per head of the population (by activity). Method and sources as for Fig. 2 but calculated separately
for incomes from knowledge-intensive and fabrication activities.
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Figure 3 Global factory income per head of the population (EEs relative to AMEs). Calculated as income earned in the global factory of
goods, expressed per head of the population and at 2011 constant PPPs. Level in emerging economies relative to advanced market
economies, see Eq. (2a). For country groupings, see footnote 5. Authors’ calculations based on the World Input–Output Database and the
Occupations Database.
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the timing that we observe here coincides almost
exactly with Dossani & Kenney (2007: 777), who
argue that ‘‘although there is little empirical evi-
dence, there is anecdotal evidence from the popular
press that since 2004, there has been a widespread
acceleration in offshoring more skilled (and cre-
dentialed) positions in R&D, design, and sophisti-
cated mathematics-based financial and actuarial
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Figure 5 Scale and productivity in the global factory (EEs relative to AMEs). a Scale (global factory workers as a share of the
population). b Productivity (income per worker in the global factory). The scale ratio is the share of workers in emerging economies
involved in fabrication or KI divided by population relative to that share in advanced market economies, see Eq. (2b). The productivity
ratio is income per worker in emerging economies for fabrication or KI relative to income per worker in that activity in advanced
market economies, see Eq. (2c). Red line for knowledge-intensive activities, blue line for fabrication activities. Authors’ calculations
based on the World Input–Output Database and the Occupations Database.
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analysis requiring post-graduate degrees to name
only a few.’’ The increasing value of KI activities in
emerging countries also supports the theory that
MNEs set up marketing, design and other centers to
be able to adapt products to the needs and tastes of
new consumer markets (Castellani & Pieri, 2013). It
highlights the need to investigate substitutability
and complementarity of fabrication and KI activi-
ties in home and foreign markets (Belderbos, Lok-
shin, & Sadowski, 2015).
Where does the much faster convergence in
fabrication activities come from? Figure 5 examines
the role of increases in scale and productivity. Scale
convergence (the share of GF workers in the total
population), measured using Eq. 2b, is plotted in
panel (a). Employment in fabrication activities was
growing at 0.9% in EEs (over the period 2008–
2014), while declining with 2.1% in AMEs. As a
result, EEs forged ahead in scale, rising from double
the level in AMEs in 1995 to more than three times
in 2014. This change is clearly visible in the shifting
in locations of manufacturing plants around the
globe, and has given rise to proclamations of
‘‘manufacturing decline’’ in the West, although
this leaves out consideration of other important
(KI) activities in the GF. Convergence in the scale of
KI activities was much slower and the relative level
in 2014 was a little higher than the level in 1995
(1.17 in 2014 compared to 0.80 in 1995). The larger
share of workers from EEs participating in the
fabrication activities in the GF is partly a reflection
of the stronger orientation towards the provision of
non-traded services in AMEs.
Productivity (GF income per worker) conver-
gence, measured using Eq. 2c, is plotted in panel
(b). Productivity levels in EEs in fabrication were
low in 1995, at about 8% of the level of productiv-
ity in AMEs, doubling over the period 1995–2014 to
about 16%. The low relative productivity level
relates to MNEs locating the least productive activ-
ities in developing countries, while keeping capital-
intensive and often automated fabricated activities
in advanced countries. Convergence in productiv-
ity of KI activities was consequently slower, with
relative levels rising by one-third: from 18% in
1995 to 24% in 2014.
We conclude that the convergence process in the
GF is far from complete. There has been a very
strong increase in the scale of fabrication activities
carried out by EEs, but much less so in the scale of
KI activities. Moreover, relative productivity levels
in EEs are still well below the productivity levels in
AMEs for both types of activities. As a result, GF
income per head of the population in the EEs is still
well below the level in AMEs that continue to
specialize in high-productive KI activities.
Scale convergence in KI activities is relevant for
the economic future of EEs in the view of the
‘‘deepening smile curve’’ hypothesis. The well-
known ‘‘smile curve’’ of global value chains first
formulated by Stan Shih of Acer in 1992 (Mudambi,
2008; Park et al., 2013) states that fabrication
activities typically have the lowest remuneration
relative to other activities in the chain, and that
this gap is increasing over time. The hypothesis
posits that, with the opening up of cheap labor
Figure 6 The increasing importance of knowledge intensive activities in the global factory. Value-added share from knowledge-intensive and
fabrication activities in global factory of goods. Authors’ calculations based on the World Input–Output Database and the Occupations Database.
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locations in the world economy, the incomes
generated in fabrication activities would decline
relative to more KI pre- and post-fabrication activ-
ities. In addition, there has been a strong process of
so-called ‘‘servicification of manufacturing’’ (Pilat
et al., 2008; Crozet & Millet, 2017). For example,
Kelle (2013) found a large shift in German manu-
facturing firms toward services exports, not only
producing, but also installing and maintaining
machinery. Bernard and Fort (2015) document the
rise of factoryless goods producers in the USA.
These firms design the goods they sell and coordi-
nate production networks, yet are not actually
engaged in fabrication activities. Fontagne´ and
Harrison (2017) discuss many more examples.
We present evidence for the deepening of the
smile curve. Figure 6 shows the share of fabrication
and KI activities in the overall GF income generated
in the production of manufactured goods. It shows
that income from KI activities has grown faster
compared to fabrication activities and accounts for
60% or more of overall GF income since 2008, up
Figure 7 Scale and productivity levels (EEs relative to AMEs) by product group, 2014. a Scale (employment per capita). b
Productivity (GF income per worker). As for Figure 5 but for separate product groups. TEX textiles, wearing apparel and leather
products, PHARM pharmaceutical products, ELEC electrical equipment, COMP computer, electronic and optical products, CHEM
chemical products, MACH Manufacture of machinery and equipment, PETRO refined petroleum products, CAR motor vehicles and
trailers.
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from 54% in 1995. It is prima facie evidence of a
deepening of the smile curve in which added value
creation in upstream and downstream activities
proceeds at a faster pace compared to fabrication
activities.14 Future GF income convergence will
therefore depend more and more on EE’s ability to
capture a larger share of KI activities in the
production of goods.
So far, we have considered the global production
of all manufactured goods together. Yet, it is likely
that the speed of convergence differs across prod-
ucts. For example, KI activities in apparel are
arguably easier to enter than pharmaceuticals if
only because of the higher strategic importance of
patents in the latter. More generally, one would
expect slower catching-up in production processes
that are highly dependent on intellectual property,
such as patents and trademarks, or that are tech-
nologically advanced and require superior capabil-
ities and reliance on tacit knowledge acquired
through learning and experimenting. In Figure 7,
we provide information on catching-up for eight
major product groups.15 We present, for example,
the GF income from electronic products. Be
reminded that this is not the same as GF income
generated in the electronics industry. This is because
many firms in a wide range of sectors (manufactur-
ing, mining, finance and business services, etc.) are
involved in the GF of developing, designing, mar-
keting, producing, transporting and selling elec-
tronic products.
Figure 7 shows scale (upper panel) and produc-
tivity (lower panel) in EEs relative to AMEs. This is
similar to Figure 5, but now for separate product
groups and only for the latest year for which we
have data, which is 2014. The products are ranked
in declining order based on their relative scale ratio
for fabrication activities. Our main finding at the
aggregate level is reflected here: we find for all
product groups that the scale gap in KI activities is
(much) larger than in fabrication activities. This is
strong evidence in favor of the technology stage
hypothesis discussed in the ‘‘Theoretical Back-
ground’’ section. Productivity gaps are major in
both activities, despite rapid catch-up in the 2000s.
In addition, we find interesting variation across
products. Not surprisingly, the scale of activities of
EEs in the GF for textiles (including textiles,
wearing apparel and footwear) is a major outlier:
the number of fabrication workers (per capita) in
EEs is more than 12 times the level in AMEs. For KI
activities, it stands at almost 4 times the level in
AMEs, suggesting that many textile workers in EEs
are also involved in pre- and post-fabrication
activities of the global textile factory. A sizeable
part of fabrication activities in pharma is in EEs (3.2
of AME level), yet it has the biggest gap in KI
activities (0.7 of AME level). The wind turbine
sector studied in Awate et al. (2012) and Awate &
Mudambi (2018) is part of machinery manufactur-
ing. The level of disaggregation in the WIOD does
not allow us to examine production and innova-
tion capabilities solely in this sector. However, our
results for the broader set of machinery products
are consistent with those reported in Awate et al.
(2012) with a relative low KI activity level. More
generally, our findings at the product level consis-
tently show strong convergence in the scale of
fabrication activities. For all products, except tex-
tiles, we find that the GF income gap from KI
activities is still formidable in 2014. We conclude
that catching-up in the GF is, as yet, far from
complete. Scale effects have been very strong in the
carrying out of fabrication activities, but still
incomplete in KI activities. Productivity levels in
EEs are still well below those in AMEs in both types
of activities.
DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have demonstrated that the
convergence process in the GF is far from complete.
There has been a very strong increase in the scale of
fabrication activities carried out by EEs, but much
less so in the scale of KI activities. Moreover,
relative productivity levels in EEs are still well
below those in AMEs for both types of activities.
Our findings do not gainsay that there are many
case-studies of successful MNEs in emerging econo-
mies that have been able to graduate. There is a
substantial literature documenting cases of upgrad-
ing by individual firms in specific industries in
emerging economies (e.g., Dossani & Kenney 2007;
Di Gregorio, Musteen, & Thomas, 2009; Lewin,
Massini, & Peeters, 2009; Nieto & Rodrı´guez, 2011;
Castellani, Jiminez, & Zanfei, 2013; Awate et al.,
2015; Choksy, Sinkovics, & Sinkovics, 2017; World
Bank, 2017). Yet these are the exceptions and not
the rule, hinting at the existence of major barriers
to international technology diffusion and the
development of indigenous innovation capabilities
by EE firms. MNEs from the advanced economies
are important players within the GF (Buckley &
Strange, 2015), and how they exercise their power
and strategic control will have crucial implications
for income distribution. Do MNEs organize their
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production networks to promote efficiency
throughout the chain, and then allocate the resul-
tant income equitably among the various partici-
pants (Kano, 2018)? If so, on what basis is it
possible to determine an equitable allocation of
income? Or do MNEs leverage the power asymme-
tries within their networks to select tractable part-
ners, and to orchestrate the activities in such a way
that the resultant income is distributed to their
advantage (Strange & Humphrey, 2019)? If so, what
are the sources of the MNEs’ power, and how may
the MNEs guard against the dissipation of these
rents over time (Denicolai, Strange, & Zucchella,
2015; Reimann & Ketchen, 2017)? Is the allocation
of rewards fair or just (Palpacuer, 2008)? Further
research is needed on the governance structure and
the bargaining power of firms, as these are prime
determinants of the distribution of income across
the production network partners (Coff, 1999; Levy,
2008).
It is important to note that our analysis has
focused on labor income. Yet a significant part of
the growth of fabrication activities (and also KI
activities) in emerging economies is funded by
MNEs from the advanced economies; hence, some
of the value created will accrue as capital income to
the MNEs, notwithstanding where the activities are
undertaken. Indeed, the available data suggest that
net FDI flows to emerging economies are substan-
tial, as are the income flows therefrom. Several
studies report falls in the share of labor income and
worsening of income inequality across the world
(Alvaredo, Chancel, Piketty, Saez, & Zucman, 2017;
Dao, Das, Koczan, & Lian, 2017), and the conse-
quent ‘anti-globalization’ sentiments among the
disadvantaged – or those who perceive disadvan-
tages – from globalization (Rodrik, 2018b). Our own
back-of-the-envelope estimates, based on FDI cap-
ital stock data from UNCTAD (and allocating
capital income proportional to the share of foreign
and domestic capital stock), suggest a substantial
increase in the share of capital income accruing to
foreign capital. In 1995, foreign capital captured
slightly over 10% of the capital income generated
globally in the GF, rising to almost 17% by 2014.
Such FDI income flows will dampen the conver-
gence in labor incomes between the developed and
the emerging economies as documented in this
paper. Now, an increasing proportion of the capital
income generated in the emerging economies in
the future may be retained domestically either
because indigenous MNEs and other firms are
coming to the fore, or because the technical,
managerial and marketing know-how transferred
by developed economy MNEs has raised either
directly or indirectly the productivity of local firms
(Crespo & Fountoura, 2007; Dunning & Lundan,
2008; Turkina & van Assche, 2018). On the other
hand, there is abundant evidence of the increasing
importance of intangible capital, such as intellec-
tual property, brands, databases and supply systems
(Haskel & Westlake, 2018). Chen, Los, and Timmer
(2018) provide some preliminary analysis of the
importance of intangibles in the production net-
work of manufactured goods, and report that the
share of income accruing to intangible capital
increased rapidly to more than 30% of final output
value in 2014. This was almost double the returns
to traditional tangible capital. Following the anal-
ysis in this paper, one would like to trace this to
particular activities in the chain. The activity of
workers can be easily described using their occupa-
tions, as shown in this paper. Yet, this is much
more difficult for capital assets: for example, a
computer can be used for fabrication as well as KI
activities. Moreover, most intangibles are produced
by knowledge workers such that there is an
intertemporal link between labor and capital
incomes. The unpacking of capital incomes into
pure profits, depreciation allowances and normal
rates of returns is needed to understand the role of
intangibles in GF incomes.
Our final point concerns technology, which we
have identified as a key driver of the convergence
process. Technology is not homogeneous across
industrial sectors, nor does it require an homoge-
neous set of capabilities, and it is constantly
evolving. The technology frontier for any firm is
thus not a fixed target, and new technologies bring
new requirements for different labor skills. One
particular instance is the widespread adoption of
new digital technologies, and in particular the
adoption of robotics and additive manufacturing.
This will undermine the production cost advan-
tages of many emerging economies, and may well
lead to production being located closer to final
consumption (Strange & Zucchella, 2017). In time,
this will lead to the reshoring to the advanced
economies of many productive activities, even
though the number of jobs reshored may be more
modest. An illustrative contemporary example is
provided by the footwear manufacturer, Nike, long
cited and often criticized as an early proponent of
offshoring labor-intensive activities to cheaper and
less well-regulated locations in Asia (Mudambi &
Puck, 2016). Since 2015, Nike has been working
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with Flex, a high-tech manufacturing company
better known for producing Lenovo servers and
Fitbit activity trackers, to instil greater automation
in the labor-intensive shoe manufacturing process
(Bissell-Linsk, 2017). Flex’s factory in Guadalajara,
Mexico, has become one of Nike’s most important
supply facilities, responsible not just for an increas-
ing share of the Nike’s production but also for a
string of innovations (e.g., laser-cutting and auto-
mated gluing) to be introduced across the rest of
Nike’s supply base. The shift to automation not
only pushes down labor and raw material costs but
also allows quicker delivery to the fashion-con-
scious final consumers. However, the automation
may also lead to a lower need for the roughly 1
million production workers employed in Nike’s
subcontractors worldwide. Meanwhile, the deploy-
ment of these new digital technologies should
result in KI activities becoming less location-bound
and thus potentially more geographically dispersed
(Mudambi & Puck, 2016), putting the developmen-
tal emphasis of host counties ever more on the
creation of appropriate skills and capabilities.
Clearly, these new technologies will have a major
impact on the distribution of incomes in the GF,
but the timing and extent of this impact are
conditional upon many other factors, not least
political responses to the likely shifts in income
and employment.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A major problem for policy-making of governments
is that the GF cuts across the ‘nexus’ of foreign
direct investment and trade policies (Buckley, 2018;
Gereffi, 2019). Put otherwise, national, interna-
tional and local policies do not address GF dynam-
ics except partially. This study has shown that
activities in the GF shifted dramatically across
locations and types. It is a mistake to assume a
uniformmovement towards ‘‘convergence’’ of man-
ufacturing productivity and scale between
advanced and emerging country locations. We also
cannot assume uniformity in technology diffusion
across locations, depending on the type of tech-
nology. The fact that these activities take place
both within MNEs as well as through market
transactions through contracts further complicates
policy formulation at all levels.
In general, it is safe to say that policies at all levels
have to be flexible to accommodate the dynamics
of global value chains. Our discussion above sug-
gested that catch-up and convergence in the GF is
highly conditional upon international technology
diffusion and the development of indigenous
innovation capabilities by domestic firms. These
in turn depend upon firms developing and master-
ing the capabilities required for KI activities, and on
governments both relaxing constraints on external
technology acquisition and introducing necessary
political and/or institutional changes. Convergence
at an aggregate level will require the development
and continual improvement of national innovation
systems in poorer economies that embrace ‘‘na-
tional education systems, labor markets, financial
markets, intellectual property rights, competition
in product markets and welfare regimes’’ (Lundvall,
2007: 102). This development may be supported by
the creation of clusters (Turkina & Van Assche,
2018). Such measures are, however, far from cost-
less (Bartels, Voss, Lederer, & Bachtrog, 2012;
Zanello, Fu, Mohnen, & Ventresca, 2015) and, as
argued above, partial at best.
The findings of this paper therefore represent a
challenge to policy-making in the presence of the
GF. We strongly believe that understanding ‘‘the
facts on the ground’’ is a vital first step in rational
policy-making. And we hope that this paper pro-
vides a stepping stone for further analysis of GF
dynamics. In particular, for policymakers in AMEs,
an important lesson is that the perceived threat of
GVCs undermining their technological edge has
been over-blown, but that at the same time policy
should focus on ensuring they keep on investing in
these higher value-added activities. For developing
countries, our findings seem to imply that simply
increasing the scale of KI activities is insufficient, as
necessary improvements in productivity appear
slow to materialize.
We have also argued the need for better infor-
mation on the generation and division of rents in
global value chains, which, in contrast to labor
incomes, are much more difficult to trace and
attribute to countries. We highlighted in partic-
ular the increasing importance of cross-border
flows of intangible capital, such as intellectual
property, brands and databases for value creation.
Second, it appears that more general policies –
such as those on education, labor markets, intel-
lectual property rights and the rule of law – are
more important in the long run in attracting,
retaining and upgrading relevant parts of the GF
than are specific GF related policies, such as the
establishment of Special Economic Zones (SEZs).
Overall trade and investment openness of a
country is a clear pre-condition for the needed
Catching-up in the global factory Peter J. Buckley et al
Journal of International Business Policy
catching-up in the scale of fabrication activities.
However, enlarging the scale of KI activities will
crucially depend on the sophistication of a
country’s system of innovation. A third consid-
eration is the absolute necessity of international
policy cooperation, as no one country can influ-
ence global production networks without reper-
cussions for others. In general, it is safe to say
that policies at all levels have to be flexible to
accommodate the dynamics of production net-
works. Fourth, the control of the exercise of
monopoly positions is as crucial in the interna-
tional sphere as it is domestically, but interna-
tional oligopolies are ferociously difficult to
restrain, in particular when the use of intangible
assets is the basis for rent-seeking. Distributional
and welfare outcomes are influenced, if not
determined, by rent-seeking and the global
inequalities generated are of increasing concern.
Overall, this paper has posed a number of
important policy dilemmas arising from imper-
fect convergence in the GF. The challenge is to
further improve our understanding and then to
agree on appropriate national and international
policies.
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NOTES
1The value chain conceptualizes the production
of goods and services as a process involving a series
of distinct value-creating activities (including pro-
duction, marketing and sales, materials manage-
ment, R&D, technology development, human
resources, IT, and firm architecture) (Gereffi,
2018). At each stage in the process, an intermediate
good or service is produced which then becomes an
input to the next stage of the process, until, in the
final stage, the final product is sold to the end
user/consumer. Some authors suggest that the
‘chain’ concept is not helpful as many intermediate
products are used concomitantly rather than
sequentially in the production process, and prefer
to refer to production networks. Furthermore,
many chains/networks involve activities being car-
ried out in more than one country – these are
typically referred to as global value chains (GVC) or
global production networks (GPN). The emphasis
in the GVC/GPN literature is typically on the
geographical location of the value-creating activi-
ties, and on the linkages between them (Gereffi,
2019). A complementary perspective is provided by
the GF literature where the emphasis is more on the
governance (ownership and control) of the GVCs,
on which activities are internalized within MNEs
and which are externalized, and the implications
for the capture of the value created within the
GVCs (Buckley & Strange, 2015).
2The previous phase of globalization, dating from
the early 1800s, had involved the progressive
concentration of economic, political, cultural and
military power in a few rich economies. Historians
refer to this phase as the ‘‘Great Divergence’’; see
also Jones (2017).
3GDP per capita at purchasing power parity
(constant 2011 international $).
4Labor productivity is commonly measured as
value added, rather than income, per worker. We
use income per worker as a proxy for the reasons
outlined below, related to the difficulty in the
attribution of capital income to countries.
5We consider the following as advanced econo-
mies: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Ger-
many, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Taiwan, United
Kongdom, and the United States, and the following
as emerging economies: Bulgaria, Brazil, China,
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, India,
Indonesia, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, Malta,
Poland, Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and
Turkey. Several transition economies are now high-
income, but they were more accurately character-
ized as emerging during most of the period studied
in this paper.
6It should be noted that this type of analysis does
not depend on the production process being linear
(‘‘chain’’), nor presumes that it is. It is equally valid
in any network configuration that can be described
by individual stages of production that are linked
through trade. To stick with commonly used terms,
we refer to all fragmented production processes as
‘‘chains’’, despite the linear connotation of this
term.
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7The data are free and publicly available at
https://www.wiod.org. Currently, WIOD is one of
the most widely used databases to study the macro-
economic implications of global trade integration.
The data are the outcome of a research project by a
European research consortium consisting of eleven
institutes. The WIOD project started in 2009 and
the first international input-output tables were
launched in 2012 (with annual data for the period
1995 to 2011), followed by a substantial update in
2016 (with data for 2000 to 2014). We calculate our
measures for the latest data set and extrapolate
backwards with the measures based on the earlier
database to arrive at series for the long period 1995–
2014.
8Baldwin (2016) focuses on China, Korea, India,
Poland, Indonesia and Thailand, at times extended
by other emerging economies like Brazil and Mex-
ico. We cover all these countries, with the excep-
tion of Thailand.
9We use so-called constant Purchasing Power
Parities (PPPs) for the year 2011 to adjust for
differences in price levels across countries, taken
from Penn World Tables version 9.0 (Feenstra et al.,
2015).
10Rodrik (2018b) discusses how the income
implications of globalization relate to the rise of
populism using international trade theory. See also
Hoekman, and Nelson (2018) and Mudambi (2018)
for complementary analyses based on international
business and global value chains.
11Note that GF income per capita is not equal to
wage, it is a per capita measure of GF income that
allows cross-country comparisons.
12All growth rates in this paper are expressed as
average annual (compound) rates.
13Doing the same analysis for a smaller subset of
emerging economies as in Baldwin (2016) (China,
Korea, India, Poland, Indonesia), similar results are
reached as both sets of countries are dominated by
developments in India and China.
14In additional analyses, we have done a similar
analysis for detailed manufacturing product groups
and found similar trends for most products. We
also have split KI activities into upstream and
downstream activities on the basis of the occupa-
tion of workers. This is a more refined test of a
‘‘deepening’’ of the smile curve. We find that the
importance of both upstream and downstream
activities increased at the aggregate and for most
product groups.
15Major in the sense that these are the product
groups with the highest global final output
amongst the set of 18 (2-digit) product groups for
which we have data.
16A final product is consumed, which contrasts
with intermediate inputs that are used further in
the production process.
17This income decomposition method has also
been used in Timmer et al. (2014), and is discussed
in Johnson (2017). Related applications that map
final output to value added can be found in
Johnson and Noguera (2012) and Herrendorf,
Rogerson, and Valentinyi (2013). The method
provides empirical content to the concepts of a
‘value system’, as defined by Porter, 1990), or a
‘global value network’ (Chaminade & Vang, 2008).
18.This is under empirically mild conditions, see
Miller & Blair (2009) for an introduction to input-
output analysis.
19.The EU Labour Force Surveys do not provide
information on wage incomes, and we complement
this with information from the EU Structure of
Earnings Surveys. For China, we obtain wage data
from the China Household Income Project surveys. For
Japan, we use Wage structure surveys. Other coun-
tries provide wage and employment information in
the same data source.
20.For example, the correspondence table between
the Australian Standard Classification of Occupa-
tions (ANZSCO) and ISCO 88 can be found at:
https://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/
DetailsPage/1220.0First%20Edition,%20Revision%
201?OpenDocument.
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APPENDIX A: TRACING INCOME IN THE GLOBAL FACTORY: METHOD
Our approach, while mathematically involved and
highly data-intensive, has a very clear intuition: it
is grounded in the basic accounting identity that
the value of a good is equal to the remuneration for
all factors of production that have been involved in
its production. This is a cornerstone of the eco-
nomic statistics regularly produced by national
statistical organizations according to the interna-
tionally harmonized System of National Accounts
(SNA). Los et al. (2015) present a model that shows
that this insight can also be usefully applied in the
context of cross-border production systems. They
proposed a new method to track the incomes that
are earned in all stages of production of a final
good, anywhere in the world.16 It considers in-
comes not only in the manufacturing sector that
finalizes the good but also in supporting industries
such as business, transport and communication
and financial services through the delivery of
intermediate inputs. These indirect contributions
are explicitly accounted for through the modellng
of input–output linkages across sectors. We follow
the method by Los et al. (2015) and extend their
model to account for value-added as well as labor
incomes. The model quantifies the network struc-
ture of the global economy and thus provides an
excellent instrument to trace incomes generated in
the GF.17
We follow the recent model of Los et al. (2015)
which shows that by modeling the world economy
as an input–output model, one can trace the
amount of factor inputs needed to produce a final
manufacturing good. The starting point is the final
output of a particular good (say iPhones finalized in
China). A final product is consumed, which con-
trasts with intermediate inputs that are used further
in the production process. Let Z be a vector column
of which the first element representing the global
consumption of iPhones produced in China, and
all other elements are zero. Then, BZ is the vector of
intermediate inputs, both Chinese and foreign,
needed to assemble the iPhones in China, such as
the hard-disc drive, battery and processors. B is a
matrix with intermediate input coefficients that
describe how much intermediates are needed to
produce a unit of output of a given product.
However, these intermediates need to be produced
as well, and B2Z indicates the intermediate inputs
directly needed to produce BZ. This continues until
the mining and drilling of basic materials, such as
the metal ore, sand and oil required to start the
production process. Summing up across all stages,
one derives the gross outputs generated in the
production of a iPhone by (I - B)-1Z, with I a
square matrix in which all the elements of the
principal diagonal are ones and all other elements
are zeros. This is so because the summation across
all rounds (BZ + B2Z + B3Z + …) converges to
(I - B)-1Z.18 Put otherwise, it shows the output in
all industries around the world that participate in
the GF of the good.
To find the labor income by workers in this GF, we
additionally need the share of wages in gross
output represented in matrix F. These shares are
country-, industry- and worker-specific, for exam-
ple, wages paid to fabrication workers in the
Chinese electronics industry. To find the labor
incomes by all workers in the GF, we multiply F by
the total gross output value in all stages of produc-
tion, K ¼ FQ and given above: K ¼ F ðI BÞ1Z. A
typical element in matrix K indicates the labor
income of a worker f located in country I in the
production of final good z. We use our occupa-
tional statistics to further split the labor income
into fabrication and KI activities.
APPENDIX B: CONSTRUCTION OF THE
OCCUPATIONS DATABASE
We collected our data on occupations by bringing
together and harmonizing labor force statistics
from the various countries. Depending on the data
availability in a country, we use annual labor force
surveys or quinquennial (or decadal) population
censuses. These data have been collected by
national statistical offices at the level of individuals
in a nationally representative survey. In the case of
census data, the sample is the whole population,
which is the ideal case. In the case of a sample
survey, the national statistical institute will apply a
stratified sampling approach and gross-up the
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results to the overall population. Thus, they can be
used in conjunction with the census data, and both
survey and census data can be used with the
national accounts data underlying the WIOD. The
methodology for harmonization is identical to the
one described in Reijnders and de Vries (2018) and
Timmer et al. (2019). For the purpose of this paper,
we updated the data from 2011 to 2014 using the
same methodology discussed in more detail below.
In our choice of data sources, we follow previous
research that studied occupational structures in the
economy. For example, for the United States, we
use the same data sources as Autor (2015), namely
the 2000 Current Population Census and the
annual American Community Surveys. Data for
European countries comes from the harmonized
individual-level European Union Labour Force Sur-
veys, which are also used by Goos, Manning, and
Salomons (2014).19 The European Labour Force
Surveys were collected and processed by Eurostat.
For China, the National Bureau of Statistics pro-
cessed the data and provided detailed tabulations.
For other countries, the data collection is often
publicly available. For example, the statistical office
of Brazil publishes all the data from the National
Household Sample Surveys online.
A major challenge is the creation of consistent
time series. Once we identify the main data source
for a country, we use the same source throughout if
possible. This approach assures intertemporal con-
sistency. For most countries, we either have a time
series or data for a year close to the starting year
(1995) and ending year (2014) of the analysis; see
Appendix Table 2 for an overview. If we do not
have information for a given year, then we use
interpolation and/or extrapolation. We followed
standard procedures using an updating procedure
that takes account of the three-dimensional nature
of the data (industry, occupational class and year),
making it consistent with the WIOD.
To create international consistency, we harmo-
nized the data sources across countries by making
two mappings. First, national industry classifica-
tions are mapped to a common set of 56 industries
according to the International Standard Industrial
Classification (ISIC) revision 4. These include agri-
culture, mining, construction, utilities, 18 manu-
facturing industries, telecom, finance, business
services, personal services, trade and transport
services industries and public services industries,
together covering the overall economy. These
industries are chosen so that they coincide with
those distinguished in the WIOD, release 2016.
Second, national occupation classifications are
Table 2 Data sources for the Occupations Database
Country Source(s) Years
Australia Labor force: employed persons quarterly large source dataset 1997–2011
Brazil National household sample survey (PNAD) 1995–2014
Canada Canadian labor force survey 1995–2014
China Population census 2000, 2010
CHIP survey 2002, 2013
EU membersa Labour force surveyb 1995–2013
Structure of earnings survey 2002, 2006, and 2010
India National sample survey 2000, 2004–2006, 2008, 2011
Indonesia National labor force survey (Sakernas) 2002–2014
Japan Population census, wage structure surveys 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010
Mexico Population census 2000, 2010
Russia Labor force survey 2000, 2008, 2012
South Korea Korea Labor and Income Panel Study (KLIPS) 1998–2012
Taiwan Manpower survey 1995–2014
Turkey Labor force survey 2006–2013
United States Population census
American community surveys
2000
1997–1999, 2000–2014
a The 27 countries that were members of the EU per January 2007.
b Bulgaria and Malta from 2000 onwards; Poland from 2004 onwards.
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Table 3 Mapping of occupations to activities
Type of
activity
Includes Occupations
Knowledge
intensive
activities
R&D, design, commercialization, engineering, marketing,
advertising and brand management, specialized logistics, and
after-sales services
Professionals; technicians and associate
professionals; clerks; senior officials and managers
Production
activities
Assembly, parts and components manufacturing,
standardized services
Plant and machine operators and assemblers; craft
and related trades workers; service workers and shop
and market sales workers; elementary occupations
Occupation descriptions based on the International Standard Classification of Occupations 1988.
mapped to a single classification consisting of 13
different occupations; see Table 1 in Reijnders and
de Vries (2018). The choice of 13 occupations by
Reijnders and de Vries (2018) was guided by the
motivation to have as much detail as possible while
at the same time minimizing the amount of
classification errors and maximizing cross-country
harmonization. The classification relates most nat-
urally to the International Standard Classification
of Occupations (ISCO), and the corresponding 2-
digit (and occasionally 3-digit) codes are listed in
Table 1 of Reijnders and de Vries (2018). For
example, the occupation ‘Managers’ corresponds
to ISCO 88 codes 12 and 13, and ‘Clerical workers’
to codes 41 and 42. Statistical offices provide
crosswalks from national occupation classifications
to ISCO 88 to comply with data requests from the
United Nations and the International Labour Orga-
nization.20 In a final step, we aggregated the 13
occupational groupings to two categories, namely
fabrication and KI occupations. For fabrication, we
used the ISCO 88 codes 61–62, 71–74, 81–82, 92
and 93. For KI workers, we used the other occupa-
tional groupings.
APPENDIX C
See Table 3.
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